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STANDARDS FOR REVISING ARTICLE 2 OF THE U.C.C.:
THE NOM CLAUSE MODEL
ROBERT A. HILLMAN*
I. INTRODUCTION
The wheels have been set in motion for the revision of Article
2 of the Uniform Commercial Code.' Technological and other
changes in the nature and performance of sales transactions
substantiate the need to revise Article 2.2 The Article 2 project
could not be in better hands,' and the revisers, facing the some-
what staggering task of sifting through the vast numbers of is-
sues presented, have made a laudable start.4
The Study Group was appointed in part to determine whether
Article 2 needs a complete overhaul.5 Although the Preliminary
Report does not meet this issue directly, its proposals are com-
prehensive. The early drafts also are very ambitious.
Obviously, the benefits of revising a section of Article 2 may
not always exceed the costs, which may be considerable. Poten-
tial costs of a revision include drafting miscalculations and infe-
* Associate Dean for Academic Affairs and Professor of Law, Cornell Law School.
The author thanks Kathryn Bourn and William Reynolds for their valuable research
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1. A Study Group, appointed by the Permanent Editorial Board for the U.C.C.,
has issued a preliminary report. PERMANENT EDITORIAL BOARD FOR THE UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE, PEB STUDY GROUP UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE ARTICLE 2, PRE-
LIMINARY REPORT (1990) [hereinafter PRELIMINARY REPORT]. A Drafting Committee,
appointed by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, has
begun circulating preliminary drafts. See, e.g., U.C.C. art. 2 (Discussion Draft Dec.
21, 1993).
2. See Richard E. Speidel, Article 2 and Relational Sales Contracts, 26 LOY. L.A.
L. REV. 789, 789 n.1 (1993) (noting significant developments surrounding the law of
sales, including computer technology).
3. Professor Richard Speidel of Northwestern Law School, a prolific and influen-
tial scholar of contracts and commercial law, and a respected leader in legal educa-
tion, is the Reporter of the Drafting Committee, which is comprised of many other
luminaries in the field.
4. For example, the Preliminary Report contains promising work on many of Arti-
cle 2's trouble spots, such as §§ 2-207 and 2-610.
5. The Study Group was asked to "identify 'major problems of practical
importance' in the interpretation and application of Article 2." PRELIMINARY REPORT,
supra note 1, at 6.
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rior compromises that may diminish the effectiveness of a sec-
tion and conflict with the article's overall vision,6 the expense of
enacting the revision in fifty states7 and reeducating the legal
and business communities, and the cost of litigation to clarify
the meaning of an inartfully drafted revision.' To help ensure
that redrafting a section results in a net gain, the revisers
should identify and follow a set of principles for determining
when a section should be revised.
Although such principles are elusive when the subject of
revision is as complicated as our sales law, the Preliminary Re-
port and early drafts effectively begin to identify them.' Never-
theless, more work needs to be done. In fact, the Preliminary
Report invites the Drafting Committee (and, perhaps by implica-
tion, others) to "articulate... policies and to improve their im-
plementation."'"
In Part II of this Essay, after identifying a few qualms about
the current strategy of revision, I will address the Preliminary
Report's challenge to help develop the content of what I will call
"principles of revision." I then illustrate these principles by fo-
cusing on a particular Article 2 problem in Part III, namely Arti-
cle 2's treatment of "no oral modification" or "NOM" clauses.
II. PRINCIPLES OF REVISION
A. The Study Group Preliminary Report
The Preliminary Report discusses several policies underlying
Article 2 as it now stands, and "endorses the drafting style" and
the retention of these policies." For example, the Report recog-
6. See, e.g., Edward L. Rubin, Policies and Issues in the Proposed Revision of
Articles 3 and 4 of the UCC, 43 Bus. LAw. 621, 629 (1988) (arguing that incremen-
tal changes may represent a comprehensive new vision); William D. Warren, UCC
Drafting: Method and Message, 26 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 811, 816 (1993) (noting that a
consensus approach to revision often frustrates bold initiative).
7. Julian B. McDonnell, The Code Project Confronts Fundamental Dilemmas, 26
Loy. L-A. L. REv. 683, 688 (1993).
8. Lary Lawrence, What Would Be Wrong with a User-Friendly Code?: The Draft-
ing of Revised Articles 3 and 4 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 26 LoY. L.A. L.
REV. 659, 662 (1993).
9. See PRELIMINARY REPORT, supra note 1, at 6-20.
10. Id. at 17.
11. Id. at 16-17 (Rec. Int. (1)); see id. at 6-20 (noting the policies underlying Arti-
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nizes the difficulty of drafting law to accommodate the variety of
contexts in which business people carry out sales transac-
tions. 2 It therefore endorses Article 2's use of flexible stan-
dards, such as good faith and commercial reasonableness. 13 The
Report also invokes the overarching themes of the Code, set
forth in section 1-102,"' such as " 'the continued expansion of
commercial practices through custom, usage and agreement of
the parties' "" and adherence to the " 'bargain in fact.' "16 In
addition, the Report recommends continuing Article 2's scheme
of supplying a set of commercially reasonable gap-filling
terms." Finally, the Report recommends restraint in the area
of consumer protection, deferring to other forums. "
Sometimes, however, the Preliminary Report fails to clarify
the principle supporting a suggested revision. For example, the
Report first states that there are "no major problems" with sec-
tion 2-202's treatment of the parol evidence rule, then justifies
assorted possible revisions on the basis of a "number of con-
cerns." 9 In addition, the Report's only explanation for suggest-
ing that section 2-612(2)'s "substantial impairment" test for
determining when a buyer can reject an installment be changed
to require perfect tender by the seller 2 is that "[tihere is no
cle 2).
12. See id. at 7-8 ("In these overlapping contexts, actual business practices are
difficult to identify and quantify, much less to evaluate.").
13. Id. at 7-9, 16-17.
14. Section 1-102(2) provides:
Underlying purposes and policies of this Act are
(a) to simplify, clarify and modernize the law governing commercial
transactions;
(b) to permit the continued expansion of commercial practices through
custom, usage and agreement of the parties;
(c) to make uniform the law among the various jurisdictions.
U.C.C. § 1-102(2) (1990).
15. PRELINIINARY REPORT, supra note 1, at 10 (citing U.C.C. § 1-102(2)(b) (1990)).
16. Id. at 11.
17. Id. at 11-13.
18. See id. at 20 ("The responsibility for enacting comprehensive consumer pro-
tection legislation should be located outside the scope of general commercial litiga-
tion.").
19. Id. at 59 (Rec. A2.2(3)).
20. Section 2-612(2) provides in part: "The buyer may reject any installment . . .
if the non-conformity substantially impairs the value of that installment and cannot
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persuasive reason why a substantial impairment test should be
invoked for rejection of a single installment."2
When the Report or a subsequent draft applies general princi-
ples, it occasionally does so erratically or curiously. For example,
the Report mentions the lack of certainty and predictability of
section 2-60922 and recognizes disagreements over the section's
interpretation, but then concludes that "there is no evidence"
that the section "has failed its intended objectives."23 Further-
more, despite opting for open-ended standards, the Report sug-
gests extensive explanation of unconscionability in the com-
ments 4 and later drafts have done just that.25 A recent draft
also includes a new consumer protection provision in section 2-
302,26 despite the Report's hesitation in the area of consumer
protection.
The Report occasionally suggests enhancing freedom of con-
tract, such as by granting parties greater freedom to agree to
liquidated damages or specific performance." If the revisers
take up these suggestions, they should provide a scheme for
determining which rules should be immutable and which should
be subject to the parties' agreement.
The revisers also should take a more consistent stand on the
effect of frequent litigation of a section. For example, the Prelim-
inary Report mentions that "[1]itigation under [section] 2-206 [on
offer and acceptance] is sparse" and that the Study Group "is
tempted to leave well enough alone." 8 The Report nonetheless
makes several suggestions about possible revisions of the sec-
tion. On the other hand, in reviewing the "basic assumption"
be cured . . . ." U.C.C. § 2-612(2) (1990).
21. See PRELIMINARY REPORT, supra note 1, at 177 (Rec. A2.6(8)).
22. Section 2-609 deals with the "Right to Adequate Assurance of Performance."
See U.C.C. § 2-609 (1990).
23. PRELIMINARY REPORT, supra note 1, at 172.
24. Id. at 79-81 (Rec. A2.3(1)).
25. E.g., U.C.C. § 2-302 (Discussion Draft Feb. 17, 1993).
26. Id. § 2-302(d). The draft of December 21, 1993 deletes the consumer protection
provision. See U.C.C. § 2-302 (Discussion Draft Dec. 21, 1993).
27. See PRELIMINARY REPORT, supra note 1, at 232 (Rec. A2.7(14)(A)) (specific per-
formance); id. at 234 (Rec. A2.7(15)) (liquidation of damages).
28. Id. at 64.
29. Id. at 64-66 (including a new comment defining offer and acceptance).
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test of section 2-615(a), the report urges 'leav[ing] well enough
alone" despite considerable litigation under the section."
The revisers also should clarify when a suggested revision
should be placed in the text of a section or in a comment. Some-
times the Report introduces comments that would explain the
text,31 but occasionally it suggests possible comments that
would supplement or restrict a section32 or would even create a
new rule.33 Sometimes the Report fails to take any position on
whether a change should be in the text or a comment, 4 or as-
signs part of a revision to the text and part to a comment with-
out explanation."
B. The Content of the Principles of Revision
It is far easier to criticize the Preliminary Report for occasion-
al misfirings than to propose concrete standards for revision.
Undaunted, I introduce the following principles to begin the
discussion. The Drafting Committee should consider redrafting a
Code section in any of the following situations.
30. See id. at 187 (Rec. A2.6(10)(C)). Section 2-615(a) provides in part:
Delay in delivery or non-delivery in whole or in part by a seller.., is
not a breach of his duty under a contract for sale if performance as
agreed has been made impracticable by the occurrence of a contingency
the non-occurrence of which was a basic assumption on which the con-
tract was made ....
U.C.C. § 2-615(a) (1990). See also the Preliminary Report's treatment of § 2-401 and
§ 2-706. PRELIMINARY REPORT, supra note 1, at 125-26, 205-08 (proposing no revi-
sions despite plenty of litigation).
31. See, e.g., PRELIMINARY REPORT, supra note 1, at 86-88 (Rec. A2.3(3)) (§ 2-306);
id. at 131-32 (Rec. A2.5(1)) (§ 2-501).
32. See, e.g., id. at 79-81 (Rec. A2.3(1)) (unconscionability).
33. Id. at 176 (Rec. A2.6(7)(D)) (proposing a comment that would set forth when
conduct "inconsistent with a repudiation" would constitute a waiver); see also id. at
105 (Rec. A2.3(12)) (proposing a comment that would require proof that the buyer
expressly assented to a merger clause).
34. See, e.g., id. at 178 (Rec. A2.6(8)(A)) (stating that revisions to § 2-612(2)
should be placed in the text "or" the comments).
35. See id. at 195 (Rec. A2.7(1)(B)) (stating that the text should assign to the
defendant the burden of establishing that the plaintiff failed to minimize damages,
while the comment should assign to the plaintiff the burden of proving damages
with reasonable certainty).
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1. The Provision Has Been the Subject of Frequent Litigation
That Reveals Inconsistent, Vague, or Ambiguous Language
The idea of revision when a section's language is contradictory
or unclear should not be too controversial.36 An unclear or con-
tradictory section cannot help simplify and clarify the law of
sales, a stated goal of the Code." The revisers should proceed
cautiously, however, unless frequent litigation substantiates and
clarifies the nature of a problem." When that occurs, the revis-
ers may only need to devise a rule that codifies the courts' ma-
jority approach, much like a restatement of the law.39 But the
revisers also should exercise their collective normative judgment
and sometimes suggest codifying a minority approach or even
some hybrid or new solution.
Section 2-207, which deals with the "battle of the forms," co-
mes to mind as a likely candidate for revision based on the pro-
posed approach. The section contains famously unclear language
and has produced mountains of litigation which, unfortunately,
has not led to a breakthrough in analysis.4" This is not surpris-
ing. The original drafters took on a colossal challenge when they
sought to supply the terms of a contract for parties whose in-
consistent forms cross in the mail.41
Although litigation is an important indicator that revision
may be needed, it should not be sufficient by itself. For example,
section 2-302's unconscionability doctrine has engendered plenty
of litigation,42 but it probably should not be revised. The draft-
36. One method of avoiding contradictory language is to avoid repetition: "A well
drafted code should state a rule once and only once." 1 STATE OF N.Y. LAW REVI-
SION COMMN REPORT: STUDY OF THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 28 (reprint ed.
1980) (1955) [hereinafter N.Y. COMM'N REPORT] (citations omitted).
37. U.C.C. § 1-102 (1990); see also supra note 14 and accompanying text.
38. Some analysts suggest that frequent litigation alone should justify a revision.
See Fairfax Leary, Jr. & David Frisch, Is Revision Due for Article 2?, 31 VILL. L.
REv. 399, 405 (1986). But see infra notes 42-48 and accompanying text.
39. See 1 N.Y. COMM'N REPORT, supra note 36, at 28-29 (arguing that a rule
should reflect present case law and reject unwise variations).
40. See JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 1-
3 (3d ed. 1988) (collecting cases).
41. For further discussion, see Leary & Frisch, supra note 38, at 422-36.
42. See WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 40, § 4-3, at 184-86 nn.1-5 & nn.7-8 (col-
lecting cases).
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ers intentionally left unconscionability open-ended, inviting
parties to litigate and courts to engage in case-by-case contextu-
al analysis of whether a contract or term should be struck down
on fairness grounds.4' Litigation, therefore, does not signal a
problem of clarity or consistency. Instead, it demonstrates a
choice made by the drafters in favor of a standard over a rule."
Moreover, the drafters' choice appears to have been correct.
Through the use of standards such as commercial reasonable-
ness, unconscionability, and good faith, Article 2 in large mea-
sure appears to have accomplished Karl Llewellyn's goal of
drafting sales law that reflects societal customs and traditions
and adjusts to evolving commercial practices, but still provides a
framework of rules to govern commercial relationships.45 The
revisers should have the burden of demonstrating that defining
standards more specifically would not upset Article 2's delicate
balance of rules and standards.46 In this light, unconscionabili-
ty should remain a legal safety valve, ensuring fairness within
particular contexts and adapting to new ones.
In addition, to rebut the criticism that standards are too open-
ended, theorists have argued that over time courts would gener-
ate criteria in particular contexts to fill in their meaning.'
Courts appear to be doing just that.48 There may be little rea-
43. See M.P. Ellinghaus, In Defense of Unconscionability, 78 YALE L.J. 757, 761
(1969).
44. The Preliminary Report appears to be in accord. PRELIMINARY REPORT, supra
note 1, at 9, 79 (discussing the use of "flexible standards" throughout Article 2).
45. Leary & Frisch, supra note 38, at 466-67 (discussing how commercial law
seeks to reconcile individual rights and economic cooperation); Sean M. Hannaway,
Note, The Jurisprudence and Judicial Treatment of the Comments to the Uniform
Commercial Code, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 962, 964-65 (1990) (arguing that the U.C.C.
is "semi-permanent").
46. "[The case against Article 2, based on the idea that the Article's focus on
fact-sensitive determinations generate litigation, has not been made." Peter A. Alces,
Roll Over, Llewellyn?, 26 LOY. LA L. REv. 543, 548 (1993). Nevertheless, courts and
commentators can and should suggest frameworks for analysis. See, e.g., Robert A.
Hillman, Debunking Some Myths About Unconscionability: A New Framework for
U.C.C. Section 2-302, 67 CORNELL L. REV. 1 (1981).
47. See, e.g., Robert S. Summers, The General Duty of Good Faith-Its Recognition
and Conceptualization, 67 CORNELL L. REV. 810, 829-30 (1982) (noting attempts to
define the amorphous term "good faith").
48. Id. at 811 (noting judicial efforts to "conceptualize" good faith).
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son therefore to saddle Article 2 standards with static defini-
tions now.
2. A Major, Relatively Complete, Change in Technology
Renders a Section Obsolete
A section may be too tied to the past. For example, it may
limit the decisionmaker to a set of preestablished elements that
fail to accommodate technological or other advances, or it may
contain outdated terminology. Consider general statute of frauds
provisions in the new age of electronic communication.49 Today,
parties may conduct their transactions from beginning to end via
computers, without generating any paper.' ° This can produce
substantial savings in time, processing, and storage." Code
provisions requiring signed writings obviously do not accommo-
date such transactions and therefore impede the modernization
of the law." One simple solution, of course, may be to define a
writing to include the ability to reduce an agreement to tangible
form.5
3
Changes in technology, unforeseen by the original drafters,
therefore can signal the need for revision. Still, the revisers
must remain cautious. Revising a section to accommodate new
technology may be premature if the technology is still developing
or industry has not yet adopted it. The experience of the drafters
of Article 4 illustrates this point. They wisely elected not to draft
rules to govern the electronic presentment of checks, an obvious
wave of the future, because banks had not yet adopted the tech-
nology and the drafters could not foretell precisely how the sys-
49. See Patricia B. Fry, X Marks the Spot: New Technologies Compel New Con-
cepts for Commercial Law, 26 LoY. L.A. L. REv. 607, 607 (1993) (noting that five
percent of sales are currently conducted through computers).
50. Id.
51. Id. at 608.
52. Id. at 611 ("The inefficiencies caused by legal requirements that transactions
be memorialized on paper can only increase as progressively more transactions are
accomplished through direct computer-to-computer communications."); accord John F.
Dolan, Changing Commercial Practices and The Uniform Commercial Code, 26 LOY.
L.A. L. REV. 579, 583 (1993) (discussing how electronic data interchange renders cer-
tain aspects of the sales law obsolete).
53. Leary & Frisch, supra note 38, at 462.
1516
THE NOM CLAUSE MODEL
tern would operate.54 Moreover, as with any general industry
practice, the revisers should be certain that the new technology
produces a welcome change. Perhaps in a paperless world, par-
ties would enter sales transactions recklessly and premature-
ly.55 The revisers therefore need to consider whether they
should jump on the bandwagon of even well-developed modern
technology. 6
3. Substantial Empirical Evidence Demonstrates That a
Section Impedes Acceptable Commercial Practices
The Drafting Committee rarely should revise a section simply
because of its own perception that the section obstructs com-
merce. The revisers should insist on substantial empirical evi-
dence of a problem. Empirical studies can be time consuming,
expensive, and unreliable, of course. Moreover, such studies are
particularly problematic with respect to Article 2 because of the
variety of contexts and transactions it governs."F Still, hard evi-
dence is superior to mere surmise. Some empirical proof, even if
not scientific or statistical, such as testimony, observation of
practices, or reports, would be better than nothing.58 Such ob-
jective evidence could be particularly helpful in preventing inter-
est groups from gaining control of a revision project, such as the
banking interests' purported domination of the revision dealing
with stop payment orders in Article 4.59
54. See Warren, supra note 6, at 818.
55. See Fry, supra note 49, at 615-16 (arguing that writing requirements serve a
number of important functions that would be absent in paperless transactions).
56. But see Egon Guttman, U.C.C. D.O.A.: Le Roi Est Mort, Vive Le Roi, 26 LOY.
L-A. L. REV. 625, 628 (1993) (arguing that the requirement that a "writing" be re-
duced to "tangible form" is unwise).
57. PRELIINARY REPORT, supra note 1, at 7. The revisers are currently consider-
ing "a hub and spoke framework" for Article 2 to deal with this problem. The "hub"
would consist of general provisions and the "spokes" would apply to particular types
of transactions.
58. For a similar argument pertaining to the revision of Articles 3 and 4, see Ed-
ward L. Rubin, Thinking Like a Lawyer, Acting Like a Lobbyist: Some Notes on the
Process of Revising UCC Articles 3 and 4, 26 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 743, 770-71 (1993).
See also Russell J. Weintraub, A Survey of Contract Practice and Policy, 1992 WIS.
L. REV. 1, 2 (arguing that rules should reflect the community's needs).
59. Rubin, supra note 58, at 752.
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As with technological changes, the revisers also should consid-
er whether Article 2 should encourage a given commercial prac-
tice, once found. The revisers should not necessarily accept all
that occurs in the commercial world.6 ° Empirical evidence can
help the revisers police the "morals of the marketplace."6
4. A Section Is Inconsistent with Other Law, Such as Federal
Statutes or International Conventions
Just as the revisers of Article 4 had to adjust to federal legis-
lation preempting a substantial portion of their work on check
collection,62 the Article 2 revisers should consider the effect of
other law on Article 2. For example, they should consider how to
minimize the conflict between Magnuson-Moss federal warranty
protection63 and the Article 2 treatment of warranties.'
The drafters also should consider how other law has dealt
with analogous sales problems.65 For example, portions of the
Convention on the International Sales of Goods (CISG)66 can
serve as a model for prospective revision of Article 2, which itself
inspired the Convention's drafters. We shall see that the CISG's
approach to some problems may be superior to Article 2's and
therefore an effective model for reform. 7
5. A Section Has Been the Subject of Several Non-Uniform
State Amendments
Presumably noncontroversial, substantial non-uniform state
amendments of a section should signal the need to devise new
60. See Zipporah B. Wiseman, The Limits of Vision: Karl Llewellyn and the Mer-
chant Rules, 100 HARV. L. REV. 465, 492 (1987) (discussing Llewellyn's view that
law should encourage better practices and control market abuses).
61. See Richard Danzig, A Comment on the Jurisprudence of the Uniform Commer-
cial Code, 27 STAN. L. REV. 621, 629 (1975).
62. Rubin, supra note 58, at 773.
63. Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2301-2312 (1988).
64. For a discussion of the inconsistencies, see Leary & Frisch, supra note 38, at
410-22.
65. Id. at 405.
66. U.N. Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, Final Act,
Apr. 10, 1990, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 97/18, 19 I.L.M. 668 [hereinafter CISGI.
67. See infra notes 130-31 and accompanying text.
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approaches to bring the various states back into line.68 After
all, one of the Uniform Commercial Code's primary purposes is
"to make uniform the law among the various jurisdictions."69
6. The Governing Law of Sales Should Appear in the Text;
Comments Should Explain the Provisions
Although the Code comments constitute an important part of
the Code framework,7" the states have not adopted them as
law.7 The rules and standards of Article 2 intended to govern
sales transactions therefore should appear in the text of its sec-
tions. As aids to interpretation of Article 2, the comments should
explain a section's meaning and purposes and provide plentiful
examples and background.72
C. The Problem with Normative Criteria Such as Freedom,
Fairness, Efficiency, and Cooperation
Norms such as freedom of contract, fairness, efficiency, and
cooperation find no place in the above list of criteria for revising
a section of the Code. In a nutshell, such principles are generally
too elastic to guide a revision and, if utilized, are too likely to
cause major disruptions in commercial practice.73 Without dra-
matic evidence of a problem pertaining to any of these criteria,
the revisers therefore should be content with the status quo
ante.
Consider, for example, whether the revisers should increase
the parties' freedom to bargain around Article 2 rules, such as
68. Leary & Frisch, supra note 38, at 404.
69. U.C.C. § 1-102(2)(c) (1990) (emphasis added).
70. Hannaway, supra note 45, at 967.
71. Id. at 985.
72. See generally Robert H. Skilton, Some Comments on the Comments to the Uni-
form Commercial Code, 1966 WIS. L. REV. 597 (analyzing selected comments'
strengths and weaknesses); Hannaway, supra note 45, at 974 (noting the inconsisten-
cy in comments' form and substance).
73. Rubin, supra note 6, at 631-32 ("Any effort to achieve . . . social equity or
economic efficiencyn will create too great a risk of disruption. . . ."). The stated
policies of § 1-102 also may provide little guidance. See In re Moore, 7 U.C.C. Rep.
Serv. (Callaghan) 578, 593-97 (Bankr. D. Me. 1969) (stating that "the underlying
purposes and policies of the Code . . . are of an essentially neutral nature").
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by permitting them to increase the availability of specific perfor-
mance 74 or to disclaim a duty of reasonableness. 7 As to the
former, academic writing is hardly consistent on whether in-
creasing the right to specific performance would be an improve-
ment on efficiency or other grounds.71 In fact, as a general mat-
ter, efficiency may be a poor tool to guide a revision because of
the many assumptions, hidden or otherwise, necessary to sus-
tain an efficiency argument. As to the latter, by allowing com-
mercial parties to personalize, but not expunge, general stan-
dards such as good faith, diligence, and reasonableness,77 the
Code already seems to have struck the appropriate balance in its
approach to intervention in parties' agreements. The Code em-
ploys this approach not because parties always understand the
terms of their agreements or because the market always ade-
quately deters merchants from overstepping their bounds, but
because the strategy probably constitutes the most reasonable
compromise between proponents of freedom of contract and ad-
vocates of intervention. The methodology minimizes the amount
of outside interference in a contract, but it also protects the
parties by requiring minimum standards of behavior."5
Notwithstanding Article 2's general approach to fairness is-
sues, should the revisers attempt to increase the amount of con-
sumer protection? Although the present Article 2 is hardly con-
sumer oriented,79 arguably federal legislation already has taken
74. See U.C.C. § 2-716 (1990) (outlining a buyer's right to specific performance,
which is available only "where the goods are unique or in other proper circum-
stances").
75. See id. § 1-102(3) (stating that "obligations of. . . reasonableness . . . may not
be disclaimed").
76. For a discussion of the specific performance/damages debate, see Subha
Narasimhan, Modification: The Self-Help Specific Performance Remedy, 97 YALE L.J.
61, 77-79, 81 (1987).
77. Section 1-102(3) provides in part: "[Qibligations of good faith, diligence, rea-
sonableness and care prescribed by this Act may not be disclaimed by agreement
but the parties may by agreement determine the standards by which the perfor-
mance of such obligations is to be measured if such standards are not manifestly
unreasonable." U.C.C. § 1-102(3) (1990).
78. "The existence of some mandatory rules may lead to better contracts. In other
words, the mixed system of optional and mandatory legal rules . . . may be best
even from an essentially contractarian perspective." Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Mandato-
ry Structure of Corporate Law, 89 COLuM. L. REV. 1549, 1554 (1989).
79. See generally McDonnell, supra note 7, at 688 (stating that the U.C.C. gen-
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up the slack and is a better forum for dealing with additional
issues. The uniform law process itself appears to impede prog-
ress on consumer protection issues. Drafting committees dealing
with other Code articles have decided not to increase consumer
protection because of failures to reach a consensus on the direc-
tion reform should take. 0 In addition, disparate interest group
activity makes a consensus on consumer issues difficult to
reach."' All of this casts a shadow over whether the drafters
could succeed in changing Article 2's tilt on consumer issues.82
Consider another "big picture" issue: Should the drafters re-
quire greater cooperation between parties, at least in long-term
contract settings, in order to reflect our increasingly "relational"
world?83 In a relational contract, the parties do not provide for
all contingencies at the time of contracting because their agree-
ment extends over time and is therefore subject to unanticipated
circumstances. Instead, internal norms such as cooperation and
sharing govern their relation.' Suppose, however, that a party
refuses to cooperate when things go awry. I have argued else-
where that the parties' norm of cooperation may become an en-
forceable contract term under the broad definition of agreement
in section 1-201(3).8" Should the revisers go further? Should
they fashion a rule expressly requiring cooperation? Such an
approach would raise several issues. Should the rule be immu-
table? If the parties can override it, is it an appropriate "default"
rule? This depends on whether the parties would have agreed to
a duty of cooperation if they had faced the issue at the time of
contracting and on whether this is the appropriate test for gap-
erally favors "commercial utility rather than consumer protection").
80. Warren, supra note 6, at 821 ("[I]t is my view that the NCCUSL-ALI consen-
sual approach to uniform state laws does not function well in dealing with contro-
versial consumer issues; consumers probably must look to Congress and non-Code
state laws for validation of their claims for greater protection . . ").
81. Rubin, supra note 58, at 746-47; Warren, supra note 6, at 820-21.
82. See PRELIMINARY REPORT, supra note 1, at 17-20 (discussing the limited scope
of Article 2 with regard to consumer protection issues).
83. See generally Speidel, supra note 2 (discussing whether Article 2 should be
revised to comport with relational contract theory, which emphasizes deterring oppor-
tunistic behavior).
84. Id. at 793.
85. See Robert A. Hillman, Court Adjustment of Long-Term Contracts: An Analysis
Under Modern Contract Law, 1987 DuE L.J. 1.
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filling rules.86 These are heady questions, fun to debate on a
theoretical level. But without the benefit of persuasive empirical
evidence disclosing a problem with the way Article 2 governs
relations or a hard signal from the courts that a default norm
requiring cooperation would improve sales law, the revisers
should probably, in their own words from another context, "leave
well enough alone.""7
III. SHOULD ARTICLE 2'S APPROACH TO NOM CLAUSES BE
REVISED?
Now we shall look at Article 2's treatment of "no oral modifi-
cation," or "NOM" clauses, to illustrate in more detail many of
the ideas and concerns raised in Part U1.8" Arguably the current
approach to NOM clauses should be revised because the govern-
ing Article 2 provisions are ambiguous and confusing 9 and
have been the subject of frequent and perplexing litigation."
Moreover, the current treatment of NOM clauses does not take
into account new technology and probably does not reflect cur-
rent practices. In addition, the treatment of NOM clauses in
international sales law is arguably superior. On the other hand,
principles such as freedom of contract and fairness do not help
us find our way out of the forest of NOM clauses.
A. The Current U.C.C. Approach
By inserting a NOM clause in a sales contract, such as "all
modifications of this contract must be in writing," the parties
intend at the time of contracting to preclude one of them from
later asserting an oral modification of a contract term. The par-
ties may fear inadvertent or unwise oral changes in their agree-
86. For example, the rules instead could be designed to motivate particular con-
duct, such as disclosing information. See Speidel, supra note 2, at 806 & n.64.
87. PRELIMINARY REPORT, supra note 1, at 64; see also James Gordley, European
Codes and American Restatements: Some Difficulties, 81 COLUM. L. REv. 140, 145
(1981) (discussing how philosophical approaches to law can become dated).
88. See U.C.C. §§ 2-209(2), 2-209(4) (1990) (Modification, Rescission and Waiver).
89. One commentator asserts that "the drafting is perhaps the worst in Article 2."
Douglas K. Newell, Cleaning up U.C.C. Section 2-209, 27 IDAHO L. REV. 487, 487
(1990-91).
90. See infra notes 102-05 and accompanying text.
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ment. They may believe that the process of reducing their modi-
fication to writing will caution them about the consequences.
The parties also may believe that a writing will provide evidence
to help them repel mistaken or fraudulent attacks on their writ-
ten agreement."'
To facilitate the parties' efforts, section 2-209(2) reversed the
common law and specifically made NOM clauses enforceable. 2
In pertinent part, the section provides: "A signed agreement
which excludes modification or rescission except by a signed
writing cannot be otherwise modified or rescinded... ."" The
drafters may have been especially interested in the cautionary
and evidentiary contributions of NOM clauses in light of their
decision to abolish the requirement of consideration to support a
modification. The consideration requirement, at least in theory,
helped to accomplish those cautionary and evidentiary tasks."4
Suppose, however, that after contracting, the parties become
comfortable with the idea of informal adjustment and begin to
enter and perform oral modifications even though their contract
contains a NOM clause? Moved by this possibility, the drafters
included section 2-209(4). Under the subsection, the parties'
"attempt" to alter their agreement orally in conflict with their
NOM clause, "can operate as a waiver."95 A party can retract
the waiver of "an executory portion of the contract," according to
section 2-209(5), "unless the retraction would be unjust" because
of material reliance on the waiver.9
6
91. See Robert A. Hillman, Article 29(2) of the United Nations Convention on Con-
tracts for the International Sale of Goods: A New Effort at Clarifying the Legal Effect
of 'No Oral Modification" Clauses, 21 CORNELL INTIL L.J. 449, 450 & n.9 (1988).
92. See id. at 453. The reasons for the common law approach will soon be appar-
ent. See infra notes 95-96 and accompanying text.
93. U.C.C. § 2-209(2) (1990). The reference to "rescission" bars parties from orally
rescinding an agreement that includes a NOM clause and then entering an oral
modification. See Robert A. Hillman, A Study of Uniform Commercial Code Methodol-
ogy: Contract Modification Under Article Two, 59 N.C. L. REV. 335, 356 n.128 (1981).
94. See Wisconsin Knife Works v. National Metal Crafters, 781 F.2d 1280, 1286
(7th Cir. 1986) (Posner, J.); see also Richard Timbie, Modification of Written Con-
tracts in California, 23 HASTINGS L.J. 1549, 1550-51 (1972).
95. U.C.C. § 2-209(4) (1990). The subsection provides: "Although an attempt at
modification or rescission does not satisfy the requirements of subsection (2) . . . it
can operate as a waiver." Id.
96. Id. § 2-209(5). This section provides:
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B. Grounds for Revising
The application of the principles of revision developed in Part
II suggests the need for altering Article 2's approach to NOM
clauses. Because of the inherent tension between making NOM
clauses enforceable on the one hand and subject to waiver on the
other, section 2-209 should contain clear language delineating
precisely when NOM clauses are unenforceable. Unfortunately,
clarity is not a virtue of the current scheme.97
For example, what constitutes an "attempt at modification"
and when does one "operate as a waiver?" Apparently not all
"attempt[s] at modification" should "operate as a waiver" or else
there would be little left of section 2-209(2)'s effort to enforce
NOM clauses. Section 2-209(1) refers to "agreement[s]" modifying
a contract." Presumably, the drafters of subsection (4) intended
the phrase "attempt[s] at modification" to include oral
agreements to modify. But what then of conduct by only one
party that suggests an intentional relinquishment of a contract
right?99
Moreover, when does an oral agreement "operate as a waiv-
er?" Unfortunately, waiver has several common law meanings,
some requiring reliance or consideration and some not, and sec-
tion 2-209(4) does not clarify what the drafters intended.' On
the other hand, the waiving party's power to retract a waiver in
the absence of reliance under section 2-209(5) decreases the
importance of nonreliance waivers.'
A party who has made a waiver affecting an executory portion of the
contract may retract the waiver by reasonable notification received by the
other party that strict performance will be required of any term waived,
unless the retraction would be unjust in view of a material change of
position in reliance on the waiver.
Id.
97. For a comprehensive discussion, see Hillman, supra note 93.
98. Section 2-209(1) provides: "An agreement modifying a contract within this
Article needs no consideration to be binding." U.C.C. § 2-209(1) (1990).
99. Such conduct might be enforceable as a waiver under § 1-103, which provides
that common law and equity "shall supplement" the provisions of the U.C.C. Id. § 1-
103; see Hillman, supra note 93, at 366-67.
100. See Hillman, supra note 93, at 364 (noting that waiver can refer to an "inten-
tional relinquishment of a right," or the same with consideration, or the same with
reliance).
101. Id. at 365.
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Not surprisingly, sections 2-209(2) and 2-209(4) have produced
frequent litigation, 10 2 enough to confirm the inartfulness of the
existing language. Moreover, the decisions are confusing; judges
cannot rely on current case law to clarify Article 2's NOM clause
strategy. For example, in a leading case, two prominent federal
court of appeals judges, both former academics, disagreed over
whether reliance was an essential element of a section 2-209(4)
waiver.'10  More recent cases have added to the confusion,
0 4
some generously permitting oral alterations and others barring
most of them.0 5
Technological advances also signal the need for a hard look at
NOM clauses. If computer generated sales transactions are the
wave of the future, NOM clauses-may become obsolete. Current-
ly, however, most business people do not utilize the new technol-
ogy in their exchanges.' 6 The time may not yet be ripe for
abolishing NOM clauses on this ground.
Generally, the revisers need more facts about the uses and
abuses of NOM clauses in practice before they determine how to
revise sections 2-209(2) and 2-209(4). The NOM clause problem
challenges lawmakers in part because they lack information
regarding whether business would be better or worse off if oral
modifications were enforced notwithstanding the presence of a
NOM clause. To answer this question, lawmakers must compare
102. See, e.g., McDermott, Inc. v. Clyde Iron, 979 F.2d 1068 (5th Cir. 1992);
Marlowe v. Argentine Naval Comm'n, 808 F.2d 120 (D.C. Cir. 1986); Wisconsin Knife
Works v. National Metal Crafters, 781 F.2d 1280 (7th Cir. 1986); South Hampton
Co. v. Stinnes Corp., 733 F.2d 1108 (5th Cir. 1984); Green Constr. Co. v. First
Indem. of Am. Ins. Co., 735 F. Supp. 1254 (D.N.J. 1990); Moldex, Inc. v. Ogden
Eng'g Corp., 652 F. Supp. 584 (D. Conn. 1987); Stinnes Interoil, Inc. v. Apex Oil
Co., 604 F. Supp. 978 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
103. Wisconsin Knife Works, 781 F.2d 1280. The judges were Richard A. Posner and
Frank H. Easterbrook.
104. Courts have had special trouble sifting through ambiguous evidence of the
parties' conduct to determine whether one of them has waived a NOM clause. See,
e.g., Clyde Iron, 979 F.2d 1068; Green Constr., 735 F. Supp. 1254. The results can
be surprising. See, e.g., Martinsville Nylon Employees Council Corp. v. NLRB, 969
F.2d 1263 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (enforcing a NOM clause in a collective bargaining agree-
ment despite evidence that one of the parties had waived the clause through conduct
lasting for a year).
105. See Newell, supra note 89, at 493 & nn.25-26.
106. See Fry, supra note 49, at 607-08 (positing that few "paperless" transactions
are taking place).
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the frequency and costs of parties wrongly believing a NOM
clause benefits them with the frequency and advantages of par-
ties correctly embracing a NOM clause. °7 Unfortunately, it is
unlikely that practices and attitudes concerning NOM clauses
will be consistent among the scores of trade cultures governed
by Article 2.
Despite their shortcomings, sections 2-209(2) and 2-209(4)
have not been the subject of nonuniform amendments. Neverthe-
less, lawmakers in another important forum have taken a differ-
ent approach to NOM clauses.' Article 29(2) of the CISG
states:
A contract in writing which contains a provision requiring
any modification or termination by agreement to be in writ-
ing may not be otherwise modified or terminated by agree-
ment. However, a party may be precluded by his conduct
from asserting such a provision to the extent that the other
party has relied on that conduct."9
Article 29(2) is no doubt in part a reaction to sections 2-209(2)
and 2-209(4). As with section 2-209, Article 29(2) first recognizes
NOM clauses and then carves out a major exception. Still, Arti-
cle 29(2) improves the treatment of NOM clauses by eliminating
the ambiguous references to "attempt[s] at modification" that
"operate as ... waiver[s]." Instead, more directly, reliance on a
party's "conduct" may preclude the party from asserting a NOM
clause. Article 29(2) does leave open the type of "conduct" and
"reliance" that can bar the assertion of a NOM clause."'
While the above discussion suggests that sections 2-209(2) and
2-209(4) are likely candidates for revision, broad normative prin-
ciples provide little assistance in determining whether and how
to revise the sections."' On one hand, the principle of freedom
of contract appears to support the enforcement of NOM claus-
es-parties should be free to bind themselves to an agreed man-
107. See Hillman, supra note 91, at 452.
108. See supra text accompanying notes 65-67.
109. CISG, supra note 66, art. 29(2).
110. For a more complete discussion, see Hillman, supra note 91.
111. See generally id. at 452 ("Arguments appealing to freedom and fairness are
inherently controversial.").
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ner of adjustment. Moreover, enforcement appears to be efficient
if the parties, in theory the best judges of their needs and inter-
ests, believed at the time of contracting that the gains in cer-
tainty and stability of including a NOM clause would outweigh
the costs of greater formality. Denying enforcement of NOM
clauses would be based on the paternalistic assumption that the
revisers' judgment of the value of NOM clauses is better than
the parties'. In addition, enforcement of NOM clauses seems to
be fair because any reliance on an oral modification in the face
of a NOM clause arguably is unreasonable. Finally, enforcement
appears to preclude fraud because it prevents parties from as-
serting nonexistent oral modifications.
On the other hand, one can argue that the parties should be
free to change their minds about their agreed manner of adjust-
ment, just as they can alter most of the other terms of their
agreement."' According to this argument, enforcement of NOM
clauses appears to impede the parties' freedom. For that matter,
efficiency arguably commands that the law enforce the latest
manifestation of the parties' preferences, here the oral modifica-
tion. Moreover, fairness may sometimes require enforcing oral
modifications because parties often innocently and even reason-
ably rely on them. Finally, instead of protecting against fraud, a
NOM clause may sometimes encourage it, such as when a party
contests an oral modification actually made or produces a forged
writing. 3
The NOM clause debate thus remains unresolved in part be-
cause the normative policy arguments are inherently controver-
sial. I have previously suggested the following possible strategy
out of this morass: courts could measure and compare the quali-
ty of the parties' assent to the NOM clause with the quality of
their assent to the subsequent oral agreement." For example,
consider parties who enjoy an informal relationship, who gener-
ally are unconcerned about and rarely read their printed forms,
and therefore are unaware of the legal effect of their NOM
112. Id. at 451 & n.17.
113. See id. at 451-52 (arguing that "a writing does not necessarily promote the
cautionary and evidentiary functions").
114. Id. at 464-66.
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clause. These parties also value flexibility and often adjust their
agreements orally, but only after careful contemplation. Because
their NOM clause is not a "dickered term""5 and because these
parties frequently adjust orally, freedom of contract counsels in
favor of enforcing their modifications. For the same reasons,
reliance on an oral modification would be reasonable for such
parties despite the boilerplate NOM clause. Moreover, enforcing
the NOM clause would be inefficient because the parties were
neither aware of the clause at the time of contracting nor did
they understand its legal effect. In short, the NOM clause in this
example does not express the parties' intentions, it serves no
useful purpose, it impinges on the parties' freedom, and it is
unfair. The law should bar the enforceability of NOM clauses in
such situations.
Now imagine a different pair of contracting parties, who
thoughtfully craft their initial agreement to suit their needs,
seek to preserve their rights under the agreement, and therefore
include a NOM clause. Suppose further that these parties estab-
lish no practice of modifying their agreements orally. On one
occasion, however, they enter an ill-conceived oral adjustment.
The NOM clause should be enforced in such a situation because
it serves the parties' purposes, reliance on the precipitous oral
alteration might well be unreasonable, and therefore fairness
does not require enforcement.
This assent-based test is appealing because it supports the
parties' "bargain in fact" and it is contextual. It allows courts to
weigh pertinent trade customs and other facts in particular
cases, including the effects of technology on the manner of com-
munication between the parties. The problem with this approach
is that in most cases the difference between the quality of assent
at the initial and modification stages would not be so stark.
Courts would have to weigh conflicting evidence concerning the
quality of the parties' bargaining, conduct, and intentions at two
separate stages of their relationship. The assent test therefore
might increase, rather than decrease, the confusion over and the
costs of NOM clauses.
115. See KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS
370-71 (1960).
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C. The PEB Study Group Preliminary Report and Subsequent
Drafts
The Preliminary Report recommended preserving section 2-
209(2)'s enforcement of NOM clauses because "no major prob-
lems have arisen."116 On the other hand, the Report acknowl-
edged that the lack of a definition of "waiver" in section 2-209(4)
"has produced confusion" and "generated some interesting judi-
cial decisions."" The Report concluded that "[a] working defi-
nition of waiver is clearly required,""' but hedged on whether
the definition should be in the text or comments." 9 The Report
also recommended clarifying the effect of a waiver, once
found.12
0
A recent draft offered two alternative treatments of NOM
clauses.'2 ' One approach broke with the Preliminary Report
and expunged all reference to NOM clauses.' 22 The effect of
such a strategy would have been unclear. Would the approach
have reinstated the common law restriction against NOM
clauses,' 3 or would the parties have been free to employ NOM
clauses under the Code's general enabling provision?
The draft's other alternative provided:
(b) Except as provided in subsection (c), a signed agree-
ment that excludes modification or rescission except by a
signed writing or authenticated symbol may not be otherwise
modified or rescinded ....
(c) A party may not assert a term described in subsection
(b) if the party's language or conduct in attempting a modifi-
cation or rescission, or otherwise, is inconsistent with the
term and induces the other party to change its position in
good faith.
116. PRELIMINARY REPORT, supra note 1, at 74 (Rec. A2.2(9)(C)).
117. Id. at 75.
118. Id. at 76.
119. Id. at 76 (Rec. A2.2(9)(E)).
120. Id. at 76.
121. U.C.C. art. 2 (Discussion Draft Feb. 17, 1993). At the time of distribution of
this draft, the draft of April 2, 1992 contained the latest comments to § 2-209. I
shall refer to these comments.
122. U.C.C. § 2-209 (Discussion Draft Feb. 17, 1993) (Alternative B).
123. See supra notes 92-94 and accompanying text.
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(d) Subject to subsection (c), an agreement may be modi-
fied or rescinded by waiver. The waiver of an executory por-
tion of the contract may be retracted by reasonable notifica-
tion received by the other party... unless the other party
has changed its position in good faith reliance on the waiv-
er. 
24
One can see that, like the present section 2-209, this alterna-
tive recognized NOM clauses and then largely swallowed them
up. First, it preserved most of section 2-209(2)'s embrace of
NOM clauses in subsection (b), adding only that an "authenticat-
ed symbol" could serve as an alternative to a "signed" written
modification.' The comments failed to explain precisely what
the drafters had in mind by the new terminology,'26 but pre-
sumably they sought to ratify new technologies for making con-
tracts.
Subsection (c) of the draft buried NOM clauses. The subsec-
tion continued the use of the curious "attempt" at modification
language. 127 If the parties made such an attempt, one of them
could not later assert a NOM clause if her "language or conduct"
in the attempt induced a good faith change of position." The
"attempt" language was not very important, however, because
subsection (c) added that a party also could be precluded from
asserting a NOM clause if her "language or conduct... other-
wise" (apparently short of an "attempt" at modification) induced
a good faith change of position. 129 Read as a whole, presumably
subsection (c) meant that any agreement, language, or conduct
that induced a party to rely in a manner inconsistent with the
NOM clause barred its enforcement.
Although the revisers followed Article 29(2) of CISG3 0 by
omitting any reference to the cloudy waiver concept in subsec-
tion (c), they introduced it in subsection (d) to "make[ ] it clear
124. U.C.C. § 2-209 (Discussion Draft Feb. 17, 1993) (Alternative A).
125. Id.
126. See U.C.C. § 2-209 cmt. 3 (Discussion Draft Apr. 2, 1992).
127. See supra notes 95-96 and accompanying text (discussing U.C.C. § 2-209's "at-
tempt" language).
128. U.C.C. § 2-209(c) (Discussion Draft Feb. 17, 1993) (Alternative A).
129. Id.
130. See supra note 109 and accompanying text.
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that other terms in the agreement can be modified... by forms
of waiver that do not require proof of reliance."'' Subsection
(d) was to be "[slubject to subsection (c)." Although the precise
relationship of (c) and (d) needed further elaboration, apparently
subsection (d) was to apply only when an agreement did not
contain a NOM clause.
As of this writing, the draft currently in circulation clarifies
some issues and makes additional changes. 32 For example, the
draft withdraws the option of deleting all reference to NOM
clauses and, in subsection (b), commits to their enforcement in
all but consumer contracts. Nevertheless, subsection (c) bars en-
forcement of a NOM clause if a party, in "effecting a modifica-
tion," induces a reasonable, good faith change of position. The
"effecting a modification" language does not seem much clearer
than the "attempting a modification" language of the earlier
draft. Perhaps the revisers should follow Article 29(2) of the
CISG which, we have seen, may bar a party from asserting a
NOM clause simply when her "conduct" induces reliance.ls
3
On the other hand, the current revisers of section 2-209, like
others facing the NOM question, appear to be ambivalent about
the wisdom of enforcing NOM clauses. Perhaps they should
avoid the murky results of compromise and abolish NOM claus-
es. Conditions may be ripe for such an action, given the complex
and unsatisfactory current approach and the questionable value
of NOM clauses, especially in light of coming technological
changes. Still, the revisers should gather more information
131. U.C.C. § 2-209 cmt. 4 (Discussion Draft Apr. 2, 1992).
132. See U.C.C. § 2-209 (Discussion Draft Dec. 21, 1993). In pertinent part the
draft provides:
(b) Except in a consumer contract or as provided in subsection (c), a
contract that excludes modification or rescission except by a signed writ-
ing or record may not be otherwise modified or rescinded.
(c) A party may not assert a term requiring a signed writing or
record to modify or rescind a contract if that party's language or conduct
in effecting a modification or rescission is inconsistent with the [sic] such
term and induces the other party to change its position reasonably and
in good faith.
(d) Except as provided in subsection (c), a contract term may be
modified or rescinded by waiver ....
Id.
133. See supra notes 109-10 and accompanying text.
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about the uses and abuses of NOM clauses before they conclude
that the NOM experiment has failed and return to the common
law approach. For the sake of clarity, if the revisers decide to
abolish NOM clauses, they should do so expressly in section 2-
209.
IV. CONCLUSION
This study of the NOM clause problem does not prove that the
revisers must proceed cautiously on all the issues presented by
Article 2. It does suggest, however, the wisdom of adhering to
concrete indicators of the need for change, such as case law,
technological improvements, and empirical proof. The NOM
clause experience also suggests the limited value of broad nor-
mative principles as guides for revision.
